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Paul H. Lorenz
Quantum Mechanics and the Shape of Fiction:
"Non-Locality" in the Avignon Quincunx
Serious readers of Lawrence Durrell are well aware of the "Note"
in the American edition of Balthazar in which Durrell announces
his intention to shape The Alexandria Quartet according the
principles of the Relativity proposition. He chooses Relativity,
he tells us, because "modern literature offers us no Unities," and
he is seeking a "morphological form one might appropriately call
'classical'--for our time," even if the result proves "to be
'science fiction' in the true sense" (5). The Avignon Quincunx,1
perhaps more so than the Quartet, can be read as true "science
fiction." It is as much an experiment in applied Quantum Mechanics
as the Alexandria Quartet was an experiment in applied Relativity
Theory, for Durrell is one of many writers working on the
assumption that the theory of the field is, in fact, the cultural
religion of the twentieth century (Hayles 4-6; Durrell Interview).
In the Quincunx, Durrell creates a world which is structured on
the spatial/temporal principles of the Theory of Relativity and
governed by the laws and logic of quantum mechanics.
Quantum mechanics came into existence only after the Theory of
Relativity demonstrated that Newtonian mechanics was unable to
accurately describe a variety of observable events because it
assumed, incorrectly, that time and space were independent
variables and that the universe was structured on the principles
of Euclidean geometry. While Einstein intended his theory of
relativity to be a correction of the assumptions which underlie
Newtonian physics, quantum mechanics demonstrates that Einstein
did not go far enough. Einstein refused to let go of the
Aristotelian assumption which stood at the heart of Newtonian
mechanics: that any valid description of the world should be based
on the primacy of matter (Heisenberg 82). Quantum mechanics, on
the other hand, describes events, not objects. Thus, as Werner
Heisenberg argues, quantum mechanics describes a world of
Heraclitean Becoming rather than a world of Aristotelian Being
(63). Because the Theory of Relativity considers "mass" and
"energy" to be essentially identical it is possible to say that
all elementary particles are energy and that energy is the primary
substance of the world. If the Heraclitean element of "fire" is
interpreted as "energy," it is easy to see that the views of modem
physics are very close to those of Heraclitus. "Energy," which can
be translated into matter or heat or light, is that which moves
and thus it is the primary cause of all change. The strife between
opposites which forms the basis of the Heraclitean view of the
universe can be seen in the strife which exists between two
different forms of energy (Heisenberg 71).
In Physics and Philosophy (1958), Heisenberg devotes an entire
chapter to the problems associated with developing a satisfactory
language to describe the insights of quantum mechanics to non-
specialists. In the Quincunx, Durrell discusses these same issues
in the brainstorming sessions in which the writers Blanford and
Sutcliffe discuss the problems associated with the presentation of
new and complex ideas in fiction (e.g. Quinx 22-32, or Livia 7-
26). The danger, as Sutcliffe expresses it, is the creation of "a
work weighed down with theoretical considerations" (Livia 11)
leading to a failure to communicate. In many ways, the quantum
physicist and the Heraclitean author face the same problem. They
must both develop a language to explain the insights of their
perception to an audience which assumes that the language and
logic of classical Western materialistic thought, the language and
logic of "common sense," provide the only true description of the
world as it is. Each must create a description of the world which
can, to quote from the motto of Quinx, "itself create the taste by
which it is to be judged" (7).
The space/time continuum which encompasses this essay is too
comprehensive to permit me to discuss Durrell's use of quantum
mechanics in detail, but I think if we get a taste from the pot
Durrell is cooking in, you will be prepared to assess the quality
of the cuisine. Late in Sebastian, Schwarz attempts to describe
his hopes for the new Israel to be established after the war. He
tells Constance:
I am hoping that something like the Principle of
Indeterminacy as posited by our physicists for reality
will find its way into the religious values of the new
state; I see you don't understand me so I won't labour
the point. But I'm hoping for a materialism which is
profoundly qualified by mysticism--a link between
Epicurus and Pythagoras, so to speak.... It would be a
marvelous contribution to the future, for we can't
continue this worn-out materialism of ours, it leads
us nowhere. And while we are eroding the Indian
vision, drowning it in our technology, India is
eroding ours, drowning Europe in vast meekness of pure
insight! (17-75)
This is one of several places in the Quincunx where Durrell
explicitly talks about the reason why these novels are structured
as they are. Let me try to explain Schwarz's comment by looking at
Durrell's use of the Principle of Indeterminacy in shaping the
Quincunx.
The Principle of Indeterminacy is introduced in Monsieur, the
novel Blanford uses to provide a cluster of themes to be reworked
in the other novels of his quincunx (Livia 11). After the
initiation into Gnosticism at Macabru, Piers, the character most
deeply influenced by Akkad's teachings, goes to the barbershop for
a haircut. There, he picks up a magazine which contains an article
claiming that there is a criminal industry taking advantage of
gullible tourists after initiating them into sham religious cults.
The article contains not only a detailed description of the
initiation ceremony Piers and the others have experienced, but
also a photograph of a "fraudulent" initiation taken at the same
Abu Manouf mosque at Macabru in which Piers was initiated. In his
distress, Piers tries unsuccessfully to call Akkad, then borrows
the magazine so that he can order a copy for himself. When he
confronts Akkad, he thrusts the magazine into his face only to
discover that the incriminating article is no longer in the
magazine. Piers is enraged and exasperated. In a choked voice he
accuses Akkad, "It was there and you know it." Akkad nods and
admits:
Yes, my dear Piers. It was there. I know it was there.
I put it there, you see; and I put it there specially.
Some time ago I asked Sutcliffe to write it for me for
use on such an occasion. And I left the magazine with
Fahem, who produces it for clients when I tell him to.
(151)
Then Akkad asks Piers the pertinent question:"Do you realize, my
dear friend, that you were able to go on believing something which
you knew to be untrue? Your belief was not shaken, was it?" Piers
admits that even though he was angry with Akkad for apparently
deceiving him, he had never considered renouncing the insights he
had obtained at Macabru. Akkad seems to be presenting Piers with
the Liar's Paradox when he takes the next step and suggests that
the article was in fact true, but Piers does not take the bait. He
only laughs and explains his insight: "Good and evil, are a
question of blood group, not angelic disposition...unless we make
a special effort we can only see the truth indistinctly--as we see
the sun, through smoked glass" (152).
This puzzling scene is actually a reproduction of a famous thought
experiment which Heisenberg often used to explain the Principle of
Indeterminacy. In this experiment, a closed box is divided into
two equal parts (fig. 1). The partition has a small hole which is
just large enough to let an atom
pass through. It may be closed
with a shutter, if desired.
According to classical logic, the atom
must be in either the left or the
right side of the box. No third
possibility exists. In the logic
of quantum physics, however, if
the door is open, it is possible
for the same single atom to be in
both the left and the right sides of the box at the same time.
D.S. Kothari, of the University of Delhi, has noted that the logic
of quantum physics is in accordance with the principles of
Syãdvãda. This experiment demonstrates the validity of Durrell's
observation that "great truths are not necessarily Facts--Facts
are dreams" (Smile 93).
Because we never observe Nature itself, but Nature exposed to our
method of questioning, we must, as Niels Bohr observed, always be
aware that we are at the same time players and spectators in our
search for harmony in life (Heisenberg 58). As a result, any
concepts or words which were formulated in the materialistic terms
of Newtonian mechanics and Aristotelian logic, Heisenberg argues,
are not really sharply defined with respect to their
meaning; that is to say, we do not know exactly how
far they will help us in finding our way in the world.
We often know that they can be applied to a wide range
of inner and outer experience, but we practically
never know precisely the limits of their
applicability. This is true even of the simplest and
most general concepts like "existence" and "space and
time." Therefore, it will never be possible by pure
reason to arrive at some absolute truth. The concepts
may, however, be sharply defined with regard to their
connections. (92)
Thus, the logic of science and the logic of Heraclitus and the
East come together. Just as Western cosmology is one skandah short
in the Eastern mind (Smile 60), our logic is also deficient if the
world is viewed through non-materialistic eyes (Coauthor 325). The
truth of a magazine article is as ill-defined as the position of
the atom in Heisenberg's thought experiment, but as Akkad
demonstrates, the relationship between Piers and the truth is so
sharply defined it is beyond question. Or is it? Our materialistic
terminology serves us so well in ordinary situations that, even
though the logic and language of quantum mechanics provides an
equally successful explanatory model (Heisenberg 184-85),
scientists of the stature of Einstein and Schrodinger would
characterize the insights of Piers and Heisenberg as "irrational
mysticism."
Schrodinger objected to the logic of Heisenberg's thought
experiment by an appeal to "common sense." He devised a "hellish
contraption" (his words) in an attempt to demonstrate the
absurdity of the logic of quantum mechanics. In this illustration
(fig. 2), R is a radioactive source, G is a Geiger counter, A is
an amplifier, S is a solenoid
relay, and C is a bottle of cyanide.
The device is designed in such a
way that after one hour, there is
a 50% chance that the Geiger
counter will have been tripped by a
particle of radiation from the
radioactive source. When the Geiger
counter is tripped, cyanide gas is
released and the cat dies
instantly. Schrodinger argued, along the lines of classical logic,
that after one hour, the cat was either alive or dead. He claimed
that it was impossible for the cat to be both alive and dead at
the same time. Schrodinger believed, and Einstein was inclined to
agree with him, that the uncertainty as to the cat's fate existed
only in the mind of the observer who, after one hour, had not yet
opened the box to determine the fate of the cat.
Interestingly, the arguments and experiments designed by Einstein
and Schrodinger have not only failed to disprove the logic of
quantum mechanics, they have helped to establish and
experimentally verify the meaninglessness of the concept of a
discrete personal identity--one of Durrell's principal themes in
the Quincunx--and have even introduced the possibility that a
multiplicity of worlds may coexist simultaneously. Schrodinger,
who introduced the wave theory of quantum mechanics, argued that
the concepts of "indeterminacy" and "complementarity" were
ridiculous, for they existed only in the mind of the observer and
had no significance in the description of actual events. In his
experiment, the cat is either dead or alive, there is no
intermediate [half-dead, half-alive] state of existence (Penrose
290-93). This seemingly straight-forward thought experiment, when
interpreted by quantum physicists, has led to interesting
speculations concerning the nature of reality.
One of the problems with Schrodinger's experiment is that the cat,
presumably, knows whether it is alive or dead long before any
human observer opens the box to collapse the uncertainty of the
cat's fate into a well-defined reality. Eugene Wigner suggested
replacing the cat with a human volunteer (known in the physics
community as "Wigner's friend"). If the volunteer is alive when
the box is opened, the experimenter could ask the volunteer to
describe the condition of uncertainty, of being both dead and
alive at the same time. Wigner had no doubt the volunteer would
insist that he had been fully alive throughout the experiment.
Paul Davies describes the significance of this variation of
Schrodinger's experiment in the following way:
In Wigner's interpretation of quantum theory, the
minds of sentient beings occupy a central role in the
laws of nature and in the organization of the
universe, for it is precisely when the information
about an observation enters the consciousness of an
observer that the superposition of waves actually
collapses into reality. Thus, in a sense, the whole
cosmic panorama is generated by its own inhabitants!
(Other 132-33)
Wigner's interpretation has been widely criticized, not the least
because of its extreme solipsism and its strong hint of level-
confusion. Though Wigner argued that quantum theory cannot be
correct under all circumstances, his argument does suggest that
the solution to the mind-body problem may be related to the
solution of the quantum measurement problem (Davies, God 115).
Wigner used this experiment to argue that if indeterminacy exists,
it is because there are overlapping waves of reality, and it is
only the presence of a sentient observer who collapses the
undetermined state of the cat into a single clearly-defined
reality.
In the Quincunx, Durrell likewise explores the extent to which the
observer shapes the events being observed. Two of these
experiments are described in Livia. The first occurs when Felix
accompanies Blanford to Riquiqui's whorehouse in search of Livia.
When their pounding on the door with a brick is ignored, they
decide to observe the events inside Riquiqui's establishment, the
box, by looking through a window. Their observation does not seem
to have any effect on the action inside the whorehouse, but when
they get too close to the action, when the observed are aware they
are being observed, they become involved in the antics of the
Prince and Quatrefages (144-56). Later in the novel, when Blanford
and Constance "walk out into the sky" to observe the Prince's
spree from the Pont du Gard, their observation from a distance has
absolutely no effect on the festivities being observed (252-61).
These two experiments in observation confirm the observations of
Bohr and Heisenberg and argue that no distant sentient observer
can cause the world of potential states to collapse into a single
actuality. Rather, actuality is shaped by those involved in the
action. Reality may be undetermined, but it does not require an
outside observer before it snaps into existence as Wigner
contends. Wigner's interpretation emphasizes the active nature of
observation in the formation of worlds but it leads logically to
solipsism, a philosophical position which Durrell rejects as
ultimately destructive. Quinx ends with everyone trooping into the
caves under the Pont du Gard, with the dangerous uncertainty that
one of the visitors might touch off the booby traps and destroy
everything. Yet Durrell sees "reality prime" in that uncertainty;
not the end of the world, but the possibility for the "totally
unpredictable" to begin to take place (200-01). As Blanford tells
Constance, the "world ends not with a bang, but a Werther" (Quinx
48), not in uncertainty, but in the misguided solipsism of a
Werther that leads to self destruction. Durrell has clearly
rejected Wigner's description of the quantum world.
While Wigner's analysis resolves indeterminacy into a single
actual world, when there is no observer, the universe exists, in
the words of Paul Davies, as "a mere collection of ghosts, a
multi-hybrid superposition of overlapping alternative realities,
none of them the actual reality" (God 116). Of course, if God is
doing the job defined by Wigner, all of these ghosts collapse into
a single concrete reality. Hugh Everett and Bryce DeWitt have
argued that overlapping waves of reality exist simultaneously, and
it is the observer who simply chooses which of the possible worlds
is to be accepted as "real" (Davies, God 11-18). Their theory
proposes that all potential quantum worlds are equally real and
co-exist in parallel worlds in which each set of inhabitants
perceives only its own branch of the universe. As Davies explains:
Common sense may rebel against the extraordinary
concept of the universe branching into two as the
result of the antics of a single electron, but the
theory stands up well to closer scrutiny. When the
universe splits, our minds split with it, one copy
going off to populate each world. Each copy thinks it
is unique. Those who object that they don't feel
themselves being split should reflect on the fact that
they do not feel the motion of the earth around the
sun either. The splitting is repeated again and again
as every atom, and all the subatomic particles, cavort
about. Countless times each second, the universe is
replicated. Nor is it necessary for an actual
measurement to occur in order that the replication
occur. It suffices that a single microscopic particle
merely interacts in some way with a macroscopic
system. (11-17)
Here is schizophrenia with a vengeance, for the price paid for the
elimination of Wigner's solipsism in the restoration of reality
"is a multiplicity of realities--a stupendous and growing number
of parallel universes, diverging along their separate branches of
evolution" (117). This splitting of reality is reflected in
Durrell's Quincunx in the replication of authors and characters
who are essentially variations of each other existing in different
realities.
Thus, Everett and DeWitt's vision, which DeWitt himself
characterizes as schizophrenic, is very close to Durrell's. As the
character Sylvie illustrates, great brilliance and schizophrenia
can not only be found together, together they can lead us, as
Sylvie led Constance, into the discovery of new aspects of our own
worlds (Sebastian 19-96). Blanford is jealous of Sylvie, not
merely because she is sleeping with Constance, but because she
understands physics: she knows that a perpetual spontaneity is
constantly recreating the world (Quinx 38). Blanford later adopts
Sylvie's insight as his own when he writes in his commonplace
book:
Ah! blessed principle of Indeterminacy which renders
every eventual second of time miraculous: because all
creation is arbitrary, capricious, spontaneous.
Without forethought or afterthought. (Quinx 53)
In Everett and DeWitt's description of quantum reality, this
capricious, spontaneous creation results in a multiplicity of
closely interrelated worlds in simultaneous existence. This
explains the reality of the coexistence of Durrell's, Blanford's,
Sutcliffe's, and all the other fictional worlds described or
presented in the Quincunx, as well as the actual worlds which
Durrell and you and I inhabit. The Bruce and Sylvie of Sutcliffe's
Monsieur exist simultaneously with the Blanford and Constance of
the later novels; each is the other in a coexisting reality.
Sutcliffe too is a version of Blanford; they are "versions of one
another set upon differing time tracks" (Constance 340).
Early in Quinx Blanford asks Sutcliffe to relay a message to
Einstein. "Tell him from me," he says, "that man only has a tendency
towards existing. I can't go further towards unqualified certainty..."
(23). Blanford has accepted the world of quantum mechanics.
Einstein, by contrast, believed quantum mechanics only described a
partial truth:
Probably never before has a theory been evolved which
has given a key to the interpretation and calculation
of such a heterogeneous group of phenomena of
experience as quantum theory. In spite of this,
however, I believe that the theory is apt to beguile
us into error in our search for a uniform basis for
physics, because, in my belief, it is an incomplete
representation of real things, although it is the only
one which can be built out of the fundamental concepts
of force and material points (quantum corrections to
classical mechanics). The Incompleteness of the
representation leads necessarily to the statistical
nature (incompleteness) of the laws. ("Physics" 31-16)
Einstein's dissatisfaction with the implications of quantum theory
led him, along with Podolsky and Rosen, to develop an experiment
which he hoped would reestablish certainty in physics. To his
dismay, his experiment demonstrated the validity of some of the
more bizarre implications of quantum physics: the necessity of
considering non-local interrelationships in the descriptions of
events. Quantum mechanics was designed specifically for this
purpose, to describe non-locality, the effect distant events
(sometimes impossibly distant in space and time) can have in
shaping the world which can be objectively discovered.
Einstein devised the EPR (Einstein, Podolsky, Rosen) experiments
in 1935 because the non-locality of quantum mechanics seemed to be
in conflict with his own theory of relativity. To a physicist,
locality refers to a situation where what happens at any given
point in space and time depends only on events in its immediate
vicinity. Newtonian or classical mechanics, and all simple
descriptions of cause and effect, are said to be local. Because
quantum mechanics was developed to explain situations where
relatively distant events affect outcomes, such as the presence of
macroscopic devices to measure microscopic events, quantum
mechanics is said to be non-local. Einstein wanted to reestablish
the independent reality of the actual world by checking the spin
of particles after a collision. Following a certain period of
time, the particles are essentially in separate worlds because no
signal can travel faster than the speed of light. He found,
however, that it is possible for the quantum state of the combined
system to be such that independent measurements of widely
separated particles yield correlated results, an effect he
characterized as "spooky action at a distance." Though it is not
surprising that two colliding particles should retain an imprint
of their encounter, the degree of correlation was astounding. John
Bell demonstrated that there is "a significantly greater degree of
correlation than can possibly be accounted for by any theory that
treats the particles as independently real and subject to
locality" (Davies, Cosmic 176).
Niels Bohr responded to the EPR results by arguing that the
findings did not contradict the Theory of Relativity if the
particles were still a part of a unitary quantum system operating
with a single wave function. It is not enough to physically
separate two particles in order to give them independent
existence. The particles remain connected, even though they may be
separated by such great distances that all forces acting between
them are negligible (Cosmic 177). The most widely-accepted theory
to explain the origin of the universe, the Big Bang, assumes just
such a situation: every particle of the universe was once in
intimate contact with every other particle. Thus the fate of all
is intimately connected. It is not surprising that some, such as
R. V. Jones, should see this universal complementarity as the
basis for a system of ethics, an idea which underlies Durrell's
thematic plotting of the Quincunx.
The implications of Einstein's experiment are startling, for they
seem to support Heraclitus' description of the world. The fate of
any given particle in existence is "inseparably linked to the fate
of the cosmos as a whole, not in the trivial sense that it may
experience forces from its environment, but because its very
reality is interwoven with that of the rest of the universe"
(Cosmic 177). In the words of Heraclitus, "the world of the waking
is one and shared" (Kahn 31). In the Quincunx, not only is every
character, every theme, every event interrelated; they merge into
each other to form one extremely complex world of
interrelationships. "All writers are the same one," we are told,
"Blake scribbles Nietzsche's notes on the same experience" (Quinx
28). As Heraclitus observed, "thinking is shared by all" (Kahn
43). The characters illustrate a trend which is echoed in the
thematic concerns of the Quincunx. Each character slowly becomes
the same character, each theme slowly becomes the same theme, each
world is really the same world seen through different eyes in
different space and time (Quinx 26).
Durrell's purpose in experimenting with the application of the
principles of quantum mechanics is closely related to the lesson
Heisenberg and Bohr were attempting to communicate to the
followers of Einstein. By the twentieth century, Western culture
had produced what Wilson Harris has called an age of "progressive
realism" based on Aristotelian principles and saturated with a
profound "linear bias" (71). We are goal oriented: we like to
travel in straight lines and prefer simple explanations and plots
based on locality, choosing to ignore the complex non-local
interrelationships which exist all around us, including the
possibility that the flap of a butterfly's wing in Brazil could
cause or prevent a tornado in Texas (Lorenz 181-84). In fiction,
in place of the linear predictability of Freudian psychology and
the Modernist dependence on the locality of the poetic image as
the medium of aesthetic communication, Durrell, like his
contemporaries John Fowles and Margaret Drabble, uses his fiction
to investigate the possibility that the world we live in is only
one of many possible worlds. The hope is that we could formulate
another world and rehumanize the implications of both scientific
and literary experimentation. Quantum mechanics, with its
principle of non-locality, has demonstrated that the simple answer
to the question of how the world is structured is that it is more
complicated than our Aristotelian conceptions and linear bias
might desire. It has also demonstrated that nothing, not even the
Romantic values, which the literary Modernists rejected, nor the
chaos of the Modernists' own atomistic impressions can be left
unconsidered in our analysis of the world as it is. In Durrell's
exploration, the values of the past, no matter how distasteful to
our own palates, cannot be ignored, for every element which has
ever had an impact on our development as a species can still be
measured in each of our individual responses to daily events.
Thus, in the Quincunx, there is something of the drunken
Bloshford, the madman Mnemides, the Vestal traitor Livia, the
foolish Prince, the Nazi general Von Esslin, Nancy Quiminal, of
Constance the psychiatrist, of Sebastian's mystical beliefs which
exists in all human beings in all situations, in the trajectory of
every kiss. Durrell's Quincunx, like his Alexandria Quartet, is an
attempt to use the findings of contemporary science to overcome
the linear bias of his readers, to show that progressive realism
lies about the nature of people and events through
oversimplification, to force his readers to see the physical and
psychical complexity of themselves and the world around them, to
see the truly multi-dimensional nature of human experience.
In a letter to Henry Miller dated March 5,1971, Durrell mentions
all of the principal ingredients he hoped to combine in the
Quincunx, and he discusses the marriage of ideas he projected. He
says, "Alexandria was the source of our science, and if the great
library hadn't been burned down we'd surely find that Niels Bohr
and Heisenberg had been anticipated by them. Even the prose of the
Quartet was intended to have the indeterminacy of quanta
movements" (446-47). About materialistic philosophy, he complains,
"Everyone wants to talk about Mao, nobody wants to talk about Tao.
What a BORE the world has become" (447). Fortunately Durrell did
not abandon the project which was to become the Quincunx, as he
had considered doing in February of 1971 (Letters 446). Instead,
in five novels, he described the primordial soup--the chaos which,
when stirred, gives birth to the universe.
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