matter: c o h e s i o n

"How can we explain the firmness of bodies and the cohesion of their parts?"[1] This question was posed by Leibniz, and I'd like to ask it again in the context of glue (the projectile of Gregory Ulmer) and the dissolution of that thing-state we call identity in the realm technicity. A body is quite capable of being in more than one place at a time (live feed and teleporting and (in Ulmeresque) 'celebrity').

glue – – – force – – – motion

– things – stick – together – for – as – long – as – the – moment – of – proximity – lasts – & – cohesion – is – a – matter – of – motion – and – touch –

Leibniz proposed that there are unitary substances (entelechy) that act as centres of force and active power, and that these substances are indivisible, and at the same time capable of unifying aggregates into something like organisms, and given that the nature of these substances is force they are analogous to appetite and sense.
moire elementone elementwo tasty line minute_relations matter natal
howsweet


Entelechy was the concept Leibniz used before monad, and in his later writings he used both terms (entelechy–monad) intermittently to designate even the smallest unit. Entelechy designates a capacity rather than the action of a capacity – so something predestined or of the soul – the way a mother can sense the personality of her child, and watch that personality transform and yet remain the same. It seems that Leibniz resurrected the notion of entelechy and substantial forms (rejected by Cartesians as metaphysical) because even though he wanted to explain the world as ultimately calculable, he needed to also account for (God): on the one hand the genuine unity which organisms possess and two (on the other hand) "the possibility of transubstantiation and of a body's capacity to be in more than one place at a single time."[2] This is an amazing find given that today God is Dead (I know this because I saw it on a toilet wall), and yesterday there where no optical fibres. What happens when Leibniz's God is substituted (supplemented) with the affects of sensation (pain/pleasure): auditory, visual.

[1] "Why does not the wind carry off our heads like balloons? Why does not a stone hurled to the Earth penetrate it to its centre …" Peter Remnant and Jonathon Bennett, ed. and trans., Leibniz: New Essays on Human Understanding (Cambridge: Cambridge U. P. 1996): "Cohesion" n. lvi
[2] "Entelechy" n. lxi-lxii